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Suppressing undesired vocabulary: the EUIPO’s decision rejecting 
the registration of the trade mark ‘Fack Ju Göhte’ should be 
annulled, says Advocate General 
 
On 2 July 2019, Advocate General (AG) Bobek delivered his opinion in Case C-240/18 P Constantin 
Film Produktion GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), advising that the EUIPO’s 
decision to reject the registration of the trade mark ‘Fack Ju Göhte’ because it was too offensive should 
be annulled. 
Background 
In April 2015, the appellant German company Constantin Film Produktion GmbH (Constantin Film) 
sought to register with the EUIPO the word mark ‘Fack Ju Göhte’, after the title of a successful German 
comedy film. The application at issue was made for several classes of the Nice Agreement, covering a 
wide variety of goods, including audio-visual and information technology equipment, digital recording 
media, perfumery, jewellery, stationery, leather products, clothing, footwear, games, confectionery, 
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, but also telecommunication and education services as well as 
entertainment and sporting activities. The relevant public was composed by German-speaking 
consumers in the EU and thus included people who might have never seen or heard of the movie. The 
goods and services at issue were addressed to the general consumer, with some of them targeting 
children and adolescents. In September of the same year, Constantin Film’s application was rejected on 
the grounds that the word sign was contrary to ‘accepted principles of morality’ in accordance with Article 
7(1)(f) of the Council Regulation No 207/2009 on the Community Trade, read in conjunction with Article 
7(2) of the same.  
In December 2016, the company’s appeal against that decision was rejected by the Fifth Board of Appeal 
of the EUIPO (the contested decision), which considered that the pronunciation of the first two words 
‘Fack ju’ would be perceived by the relevant public almost indistinguishable from that of the English 
expression ‘Fuck you’. But, even if no sexual connotations were attributed to these word elements, the 
expression amounted to ‘an insult in bad taste, shocking and vulgar’. Also, the addition of the word 
‘Göhte’, which closely resembled the name of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, degraded posthumously 
the respected writer. In the Board’s view, the misspelt name did nothing to mitigate the insult. Moreover, 
pursuant to Article 7(3) of the 2009 Regulation, the success of the film which had been seen by millions 
of people could not be relied upon to overcome the obstacle presented by the ground for refusal at issue; 
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nor was it possible to infer from the use of the words ‘Fack ju’ in the film’s title that these were socially 
acceptable. 
In February 2017, Constantin Film sought before the GC the annulment of the contested decision but 
the GC dismissed the action and upheld the initial EUIPO ruling (see Case T-69/17). The company 
appealed that judgment before the Court of Justice on three grounds. By the first ground, the appellant 
claimed that the GC had erred in its interpretation and application of Article 7(1)(f) of the 2009 Regulation. 
The second and third grounds concerned breaches of the principles of equal treatment and good 
administration respectively. 
The alleged errors in the interpretation and application of Article 7(1)(f) of the 2009 Regulation 
Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation No 207/2009 prohibits the registration of Community trade marks which are 
‘contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality.’ The new Regulation 2017/1001 on the EU 
Trade Mark preserves the original wording untouched. In the AG’s opinion, the key issue raised by the 
first ground of appeal related to the elements that need to be considered when assessing a trade mark 
application through the lens of Article 7(1)(f). To what extent, in particular, do the social context of the 
relevant sign and its proven impact on the relevant public play a role in this assessment? 
This question raised in turn another concern relative to the role of freedom of expression in trade mark 
law. Contrary to what the GC had ostensibly held in paragraph 29 of its judgment, the AG observed that 
freedom of expression ‘clearly applies’ in the field of trade marks, though: 
in contrast to the fields of arts, culture, and literature, the weight to be given to freedom of expression in 
the area of trade mark law may be somewhat different, perhaps slightly lighter, in the overall balancing of 
the rights and interests present. 
In other words, the essential aim of trade marks is to distinguish the goods or services of one trader from 
those of another and guarantee their origins and quality to consumers. The protection of freedom of 
expression is not their primary function, but it must be taken into account in the overall balancing exercise 
between an applicant’s interest in securing the registration of a sign (and the specific protection conferred 
by it) with the interest of the public in not being confronted with vulgar symbols, phrases or words used 
in the course of the trade. This is also consistent with Recital 21 of the 2017 Regulation, which reads 
that ‘this Regulation should be applied in a way that ensures full respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and in particular the freedom of expression.’ So, how is freedom of expression to be balanced 
against the concepts of public policy and accepted principles of morality? Could it be said that the EUIPO 
adopted in the case at hand a less liberal vision of public morality and disregarded the freedom of 
expression realised by the contested trade mark? 
The AG noted that the EUIPO has a role to play in the protection of public policy and prevailing standards 
of morality. However, this comes with an important caveat: 
[…] the protection of public policy and morality is certainly not the key or predominant role of EUIPO and 
EU trade mark law. The absolute ground for refusal in Article 7(1)(f) effectively acts as a safety net, 
potentially setting limits to the realisation of other aims. But it is certainly not an aim in and of itself. 
With respect to the concepts of ‘public policy’ and ‘accepted principles of morality’, the AG disagreed 
with the GC’s position that the terms are interchangeable and the EUIPO is not required to differentiate 
between them. The AG suggested that there was ‘a conceptual difference in terms of how, by whom and 
with regard to what the content of each of those categories is defined.’ 
Public policy is a normative vision of values and goals, defined by the relevant public authority, to be 
pursued now and in the future, that is, prospectively. […] In contrast to the top-down nature of public 
policy, [accepted principles of morality] grow from the bottom up. [They] refer to values and convictions 
currently adhered to by a given society, set and enforced by the prevailing social consensus within that 
society at a given time. […] The key difference between the two concepts is how they are established and 
thus ascertained. 
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A fair degree of overlap between the two concepts is admittedly present in some instances, e.g. trade 
marks invoking, or otherwise relating to, terrorism acts. However, the differences between them have 
implications for what exactly is to be assessed and how, if either concept is to be invoked. When the 
absolute ground for refusal of accepted principles of morality is specifically relied upon, which was the 
case in the present proceedings, it is necessary to look at ‘case-specific evidence’ to ascertain how the 
relevant society (the public in question) would presumably react to that sign being affixed to the 
respective goods or services. This is relevant therefore when looking at what the EUIPO and the GC 
should have examined when the former rejected the appellant’s application and the latter endorsed this 
approach. Importantly, the EUIPO must establish ‘why it believes that a given sign would offend those 
principles’. Whilst such a conclusion might not always be borne out by in-depth empirical research vis-
à-vis a given sign, the Office should provide an ‘informed estimation’ which: 
must be grounded in a specific social context, and it cannot ignore factual evidence that either confirms 
or possibly casts doubt on EUIPO’s own views on what does or does not conform to accepted principles 
of morality within a given society at a given time. 
A practical implication of this is that the assessment for compliance with accepted principles of morality 
needs to be carried out with reference to the wider societal perception and context; not by exclusively 
relying on the sign per se, i.e. only by reference to its intrinsic qualities. The AG concluded that the 
EUIPO assessment failed to meet these standards in the present case. In this respect, he highlighted 
certain factors which, although not determinative of the registration of the mark in dispute, strongly 
evidenced that the expression ‘Fack Ju Göhte’ did not raise eyebrows in the minds of the various parts 
of the German-speaking public. These included the ‘great success’ of the film in German-speaking 
countries without triggering much controversy over its title and the fact that the film title was authorised 
and released for screening to younger audiences. In the AG’s opinion, the General Court also failed to 
consider relevant elements of the context and thus incorrectly interpreted Article 7(1)(f) of the Regulation. 
Infringement of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration 
The second and third grounds concerned the alleged lack of coherence in the decision-making approach 
of the EUIPO and its obligation to give a reasoned explanation for the departure from its previous practice 
(Article 75 of the 2009 Regulation and Article 94(1) of the 2017 Regulation). Constantin Film submitted 
that the GC, by failing to apply to the present case the EUIPO’s ruling in the application for the sign ‘Die 
Wanderhure’ (decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of 28 May 2015, R 2889/2014-4), the GC arbitrarily 
treated in different ways factually similar circumstances which concerned the application of the same 
legal provision. The appellant also submitted that by examining the sign ‘Fuck you Goethe’ - instead of 
‘Fack Ju Göhte’ - and by not applying the findings of Die Wanderhure, the GC made a decision which 
was unforeseeable and not verifiable. 
Die Wanderhure concerned a sign which was also the name of a German novel and its film adaptation. 
In German, the word ‘hure’ is a synonym for prostitute. The EUIPO (then known as the Office of the 
Harmonisation in the Internal market) did not consider the trade mark immoral and allowed its 
registration. In light of this, the AG argued that the GC erred in law when it did not sanction the EUIPO’s 
failure to provide a suitable explanation for the departure from its previous practice or a plausible reason 
as to why the application for the ‘Fack Ju Göhte’ sign had to be decided differently compared to the more 
liberal outcome reached in Die Wanderhure. 
Conclusion 
For all these reasons, AG Bobek proposed that the Court of Justice should set aside the judgment of the 
GC and annul the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO. He also suggested that the EUIPO 
should be ordered to bear its own costs and pay the costs incurred by Constantin Film both in the 
proceedings at first instance and on appeal in the present case. 
Commentary 
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In sum, the AG’s opinion sensibly concludes that the GC was wrong in its determination because the 
offensive or vulgar nature of the applied-for mark had not been proved with reference to a specific social 
context at a given time. It should be noted that the AG’s opinion is not binding on the Court of Justice. 
The AG’s role is to propose to the Court an independent legal solution to the cases for which he or she 
is responsible. The Judges of the Court are now beginning their deliberations in this case and will deliver 
their judgment at a later date.  
This is also a timely reasoned submission. On 24 June 2019, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its judgment in Iancu v Brunetti, holding that The Lanham Act’s prohibition on the registration of 
‘immoral [or] scandalous’ trademarks violates the First Amendment. In doing so, America’s highest court 
overturned more than 70 years of legal practice and delivered a win for Eric Brunetti, whose trademark 
for the streetwear brand FUCT had been rejected on these grounds. 
The importance of the present appeal lies in the fact that it invites the Court of Justice of the EU to clarify 
for the first time the applicable legal test when considering whether to reject an application for a trade 
mark based on Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation No 207/2009. In other words, under what circumstances can 
a trade mark application be considered ‘contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality’? 
The Court is also asked to provide guidance on the scope of the EUIPO’s obligation to state reasons 
when it wishes to adopt a decision that could appear to depart from previous case law on similar matters.  
Another interesting issue arising from this case is the legal test applied by the EUIPO and the GC when 
assessing an application for the registration of a sign which contains an arguably offensive expression 
that matches the title of a successful film. In Fack Ju Göhte, it is perhaps hard to escape the situational 
irony that the Goethe-Institut uses the film bearing the mark in dispute for pedagogical purposes. Whilst 
rating of feature films in member states is a distinct regulatory regime from EU Trade Mark law, previous 
rulings issued by national bodies such as the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) in relation to 
screening conditions apparently acquire some relevance in the assessment of trade mark legislation and 
specifically Article 7(1)(f) of the EUTM Regulation. National regulators are, as the AG put it, ‘no doubt 
better placed than an EU-wide trade mark office’ to evaluate what is immoral at a given time in a certain 
member state, and therefore their findings should be duly taken into account. Although these cannot 
prevent the EUIPO from concluding that the mark applied-for is an affront to accepted principles of 
morality, national bodies’ assessments can have, in this context, the effect of raising the level of moral 
reasoning that must be provided by the EUIPO. Their findings also call for more persuasive justifications 
on its behalf if it decides to deviate from what national regulators ascertained to be acceptable (within 
the same linguistic or geographical space as that chosen by the Office for its own assessment) and 
ultimately refuse registration of an eponymous mark. 
Finally, when assessing the suitability of a sign for registration, the ground for refusal relating to accepted 
principles of morality refers to subjective values which nevertheless need to be applied as objectively as 
possible, taking a sign specifically and comprehensively into consideration. It involves, among others, 
the often delicate balancing of an applicant’s interest in having a sign registered with the interest of the 
public in not being confronted with upsetting or offensive trade marks. The EUTM Regulation provides 
no indication of how precisely such a balance ought to be conducted in individual cases. The keenly-
awaited Court of Justice decision is expected to bring an additional layer of clarity in relation to the criteria 
that need to be considered in making this judgment call, so that a fair degree of predictability as to the 
potential outcome is achieved. If, however, the tool provided by Article 7(1)(f) of the Regulation is applied 
too broadly or too strictly, there is a risk that it will be overly effective, potentially limiting investment in 
otherwise legitimate trade marks.  
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